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Abstract
A ﬁrm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each ﬁrm has private
information about both his ﬁrm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would
be realized by the merger involving his ﬁrm. We characterize incentive-eﬃcient mechanisms in
two cases. First, we assume that the value of any newly formed partnership is veriﬁable, hence
transfers can be made contingent on the new information accruing after the merger. Second, we
study the case of uncontingent rules. In the ﬁrst case, we show that it is not optimal, in general,
to redistribute shares of non-merging ﬁrms, and identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the implementability of eﬃcient merger rules. In the second case, we show that the ﬁrst-best
can be obtained i) always, if the synergy values are privately known but the ﬁrms’ stand-alone
values are observable; ii)o n l yw i t hs u ﬃciently large synergies, if the ﬁrms’ stand-alone are
privately known; and iii) never, if the set of feasible mechanisms is restricted to “auctions in
shares”.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We consider a model in which a ﬁrm can merge with one of many potential partners. If a merger
takes place, the total value of the newly formed partnership can be higher or lower than the sum of
the stand alone values. Eﬃciency dictates that the merger generating the highest synergy should
take place, if and only if the added value is positive. We study the problem of designing merger
mechanisms which implement eﬃcient outcomes under the assumption that each ﬁrm’s owner has
private information about both its stand-alone value and the value of the synergies that would be
realized if it merged.
We analyze two polar cases, depending on whether the value of the newly formed partnership is
veriﬁable or not. In the ﬁrst case, transfers of shares and payments can be made contingent on the
realized value of the merger. In the second case only linear sharing rules, i.e. equity payments can
be used.
In the veriﬁable case, we begin by showing that the surplus distribution among all agents depends
only on how the shares of all non-merging ﬁrms are allocated, and not on the ownership structure
of any new ﬁrm. Intuitively this is because, unlike the value of any new ﬁrm, the value of each
non-merging ﬁrm is not veriﬁable. Therefore, while shares of new ﬁrms are equivalent to money,
redistributing shares of any non-merging ﬁrm creates information rent for its owner.
This helps understand our next result, that is, eﬃcient merger rules can be implemented if and
only if they can be implemented with mechanisms which do not involve redistributions of non-
merging ﬁrms. The problem of implementing eﬃcient merger rules then boils down to a classic
social choice problem for which it is suﬃcient to focus on Groves mechanisms. This allows us to
identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the implementability of eﬃcient merger rules.
For the non-veriﬁable case, we ﬁrst analyze the special case in which ﬁrm 0 has no private
information and zero stand-alone value (bankruptcy auctions). We show that if monetary transfer
are ruled out, and the eﬃcient merger rule p∗ assigns diﬀerent partners for diﬀerent realizations
of the ﬁrms types, the ﬁrst-best cannot be implemented by any incentive compatible mechanism,
unless the choice of the merger partner is trivial.
2We then consider the problem of designing eﬃcient merger mechanisms with a single potential
partner in two cases: i) when each ﬁrm’s stand-alone value is privately known, but it is common
knowledge that the merger is always welfare enhancing, and ii) when the ﬁrms’ stand alone values
are known, but each ﬁrm observes a private signal about the merger’s value. We show that a wedge
exists between the ﬁrst best and the incentive-eﬃcient merger rule only in the second case.
Our paper is related to work by Hansen (1985), Cremer (1987), Samuelson (1987) and Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2000, 2003). Hansen (1985) has analyzed a model in which multiple
ﬁrms compete to acquire a target ﬁrm, and shows that an (English) auction in which bidders oﬀer
fractions of the merged ﬁrm to the target generates a higher expected proﬁt for the target than
any auction in which only cash is used. Cremer (1987) has pointed out that with a combination
of cash and shares the target can extract all gains from trade. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2000) consider diﬀerent securities and show that higher revenue is obtained from the security whose
valuation is more sensitive to changes in the bidder’s types.
All these results apply only to the case in which there is uncertainty only on the value of the
joint asset, and not on the stand alone value of each ﬁrm. Samuelson (1987) argued that two-
dimensional uncertainty would lead to diﬀerent results. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003)
consider a second price auction in a model of mergers where bidders have information about both
the joint value of the asset and the stand alone value of their ﬁrm. None of the papers discussed
above considers the design of merger mechanisms in environments where players have information
about the joint value of the asset and their stand alone values.
Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) have studied the problem of dissolving partnerships
eﬃciently.1 In their framework, eﬃciency requires that a single agent buys all his partners out
of the company. Their main result is that the eﬃcient outcome can be implemented even if each
partner is privately informed about his willingness to pay for the entire ﬁrm, as long as the initial
distribution of property rights is suﬃciently balanced. In our framework, potential partners can
pay with both money and stocks. Thus the assumption that ﬁrms are privately informed about
the value of their own stocks adds a layer of adverse selection to the mechanism design problem.
1See also Jehiel and Pauzner (2002).
3A central theme of our analysis will be identifying cases in which stocks are perfect substitutes for
money and cases in which they are not.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3 we focus
on the case in which the value of any new ﬁrm is ex post veriﬁable, so that any transfer of shares
and money can be made contingent on the actual realization of the total value of the newly formed
partnerships. In Section 4 we characterize eﬃcient mechanisms under the assumption that no new
information can be gathered once any merger takes place. Section 5 concludes. The appendix
contains all proofs.
2 The Model
The owner of a ﬁrm, call it ﬁrm 0, faces a set N := {1,...,n} of potential merger partners. We will
use the same index in the set N0 := {0,1,...,n} to denote both a ﬁrm and the agent who owns it.
Each ﬁrm j ∈ N0 has stand-alone value xj.I fﬁrms 0 and i ∈ N merge, the total net worth of the
newly formed partnership is
ri = x0 + xi + γi (wi,v i),
where wi and vi are random variables whose realizations are observed only by agent 0 and i
respectively, and γi is the synergy function specifying the amount by which the total value ri
exceeds the sum of the two stand-alone values x0 + xi.T h e t e r m γi (wi,v i) can be interpreted
as the expected synergy conditional on the pair (wi,v i). We assume that γi takes the separable
form γi (wi,v i)=g (wi)+h(vi), and after redeﬁning the signals as b wi := g (wi) and b vi := h(vi) if
necessary, we write without additional loss of generality
γi (wi,v i)=wi + vi.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that any merger not involving ﬁrm 0, or involving more
than two ﬁrms, generates negative synergies.
The random variables wi,v i, i ∈ N,a n dxj, j ∈ N0, are distributed independently, with re-




, all closed intervals of real numbers. Agent 0’s type
4θ0 := (x0,w 1,...,w n) is drawn from the c.d.f. F0 with support
Θ0 := [x0,x0] × [w1,w1] × ... × [wn,wn].
For each i ∈ N, agent i’s type θi := (xi,v i) is drawn from the c.d.f. Fi with support
Θi := [xi,xi] × [vi,vi].
As usual, we let symbols without subscripts denote variables pertaining to all agents, e.g. θ :=
(θ0,θ1,...,θn), Θ := Θ0 × Θ1 × ... × Θn,a n dF (θ) ≡
Y
i∈N0
Fi (θi); and symbols with the subscript
−i denote variables pertaining to all agents in N0\{i},e . g .θ−i := (θ0,...,θi−1,θi+1,...,θn), Θ−i :=




A feasible outcome consists of the following three objects:
1. A (stochastic) merger rule p =( p0,p 1,...,p n) ∈ ∆,w h e r e∆ denotes the n-dimensional
simplex, p0 is the probability of no merger taking place, and pi, i ∈ N, the probability that
ﬁrms 0 and i merge.
2. A collection of sharing rules s =
¡
s0,s 1,...,s n¢





is a matrix of
dimension (n +1 )× (n +1 ) with si
jk denoting the fraction of ﬁrm j’s total value going to













∈ ∆. We adopt the convention that, when
ﬁrm 0 and i merge, the new ﬁrm takes the name of ‘ﬁrm 0’, while ﬁrm i disappears. Thus
si
0k denotes the fraction of the total value ri going to agent k, and we set si
ik =0 , ∀i ∈ N and




j· ∈ ∆,i , j∈ N0 | s1
1· = ... = sn
n· =0 ,
ª
3. A collection of monetary transfers t =
¡
t0,t 1,...,t n¢









j denoting the monetary transfer2 to agent j when ﬁrm 0 and ﬁrm i merge, with i =0
2Since all agents are risk neutral, restricting attention to deterministic monetary transfers is without loss of
generality.
5again denoting the case of no merger. We will impose budget balance, allowing for the strict














Af e a s i b l emechanism is a mapping µ : Θ → ∆ × S × T. With slight abuse of notation and
terminology, the mapping µ will be written as µ =( p,s,t), and the functions p : Θ → ∆,s: Θ → S
and t : Θ → T will be called the merger rule,t h esharing rule and the transfer rule, respectively.
The focus will be on implementing am e r g e rr u l ep.T h a t i s , g i v e n p, we will check for the
existence of a sharing rule s and a transfer rule t such that the mechanism µ =( p,s,t) is incentive-
feasible; that is, in the revelation game induced by the mechanism µ, truth-telling is individually
rationality for each agent and forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Note that the budget balance
constraint is embedded in the deﬁnition of feasible monetary transfers.
In the game induced by the mechanism (p,s,t), the expected utility of agent j ∈ N0, when the














































and the interim expected surplus of type θj ∈ Θj of agent j, when he reports θ0
j ∈ Θj and all other















A mechanism satisﬁes individual rationality if e Uj (θj,θj) ≥ xj, ∀θj ∈ Θj,j∈ N0. Redeﬁning agent











− xj,( 2 )
3If the sum of the transfers is strictly negative the ﬁrms would be better oﬀ renegotiating the contract. However,
it is easy to make the mechanism renegotiation proof prescribing that the money is given to an external party.
6we can rewrite the IR constraints as
















Since we have just subtracted a constant to agent j’s utility function, a mechanism induces par-
ticipation and truthtelling as an equilibrium when the payoﬀ functions are b uj if and only if it does
so when the functions are e uj. From now on we will work with the ‘normalized’ utility functions b uj
g i v e ni n( 2 ) .
Whether a certain mechanism satisﬁes incentive compatibility depends on the information avail-
able to the agents and to the mechanism designer. In particular, the set of incentive-feasible
mechanisms diﬀers depending on the information that becomes available after a merger. We will
analyze the following two polar cases:
1. No after-merger information. In this case the mechanism design problem is the classic, sta-
tic one. Invoking the revelation principle, we will restrict attention without loss of generality
to incentive compatible and individually rational direct revelation mechanisms.
2. Veriﬁable merger values. In this case the total value of any newly formed ﬁrm is veriﬁable.
The designer can use this information, together with agents’ reports about their types, to
determine the outcome. We will assume that no information about the non-merging ﬁrms
becomes available after the agents’ reports.
W ew i l lb e g i nw i t ht h ev e r i ﬁable case.
3V e r i ﬁable Merger Values
In this section we assume that, if ﬁrms 0 and i merge, the total value of the new ﬁrm, ri becomes
veriﬁable ex post. Given a mechanism µ =( p,s,t), let Pi
j (θj) denote the probability that ﬁrm 0
7and ﬁrm i merge, conditional on agent j reporting θj ∈ Θj, and all other agents reporting their





pj (θj,y)dF−i (y), θj ∈ Θj,i , j ∈ N0. (4)





















i is the set of reports that agent i can make for which there is no chance of his ﬁrm
merging. Similarly, ΘNo
0 (i) is the set of reports that agent 0 can make for which the merger with
ﬁrm i has no chance. These sets can be non-empty. For example ΘNo
i is non-empty if the merger
rule p is eﬃcient, and vi + wi < 0 for some vi.
Since the value of any new ﬁrm ri is veriﬁable, the mechanism can dictate that agents 0 and i
pay large ﬁnes whenever ri turns out to be diﬀerent from the value implied by the agents’ reports,
i.e. whenever their reports θ0
0 and θ0




i 6= ri. Since in equilibrium





i 6= xi + vi, unless (x0
i,v0
i) ∈ ΘNo
i (in which case the lie would go undetected.) Thus the
incentive compatibility constraints for agent i ∈ N can be written as






i ∈ Li (τi) ∪ ΘNo
i , ∀θi ∈ Θi, (5)





Similarly, since agent 0 expects all other agents to report their true types, it cannot be optimal for
him to report θ0
0 such that x0
0 +w0
i 6= x0 +wi, unless θ0
0 ∈ ΘNo
0 (i). Thus his incentive compatibility
constraints can be written as








L0 (σi) ∪ ΘNo
0 (i)
¢
, ∀θ0 ∈ Θ0,( 6 )









In trying to implement a given merger rule p, the designer can use both shares and money
to satisfy the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraints. It is natural to
ask whether it is possible to restrict the class of mechanisms that we need to consider, given the
multiplicity of ways in which payments can be made. Our ﬁrst lemma establishes that neither the
implementability of a given merger rule, nor the surplus distribution among the n+1agents depend
on how the shares of any new ﬁrm are allocated. Intuitively, this is because the value of the new
ﬁrm is veriﬁable, and thus its shares are equivalent to money.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the mechanism (p,s,t) is incentive-feasible, i.e. it satisﬁes budget balance,
individual rationality and incentive compatibility. Then, for any sharing rule e s in which the shares
of all all non-merging ﬁr m sa r ea l l o c a t e da si ns,i . e .e s0
j· = s0
j· ∀j ∈ N0, and e si
j· = si
j· ∀i,j ∈ N,
and the ownership structure of any new ﬁrm e si
0·,i∈ N, is arbitrary in ∆, there exists a feasible




is also incentive-feasible, and generates the same
utility function b uj, deﬁned in (1), for each j ∈ N0.
Lemma 1 allows us to focus, without loss of generality, to mechanisms in which agent 0 receives all
shares of the merged ﬁrm, i.e. si
00 (θ)=1 , ∀θ ∈ Θ,i∈ N. In this case the agents’ utility functions






















































4If ri were observable to the merging owners, but not veriﬁable, it would still be possible to elicit truthfully the
total value ri, without having to pay any information rent. Formally, we would be using a two-stage direct revelation















































































Do the equivalence properties established in Lemma 1 also apply to the shares of each non-
merging ﬁrm? In particular, is there any loss of generality in restricting attention to mechanisms
in which the owner of each non-merging ﬁrm retains all its shares? If we could show that any
implementable merger rule p can be implemented with a mechanism (p,s,t) where the sharing rule




ii (θ)=1 , ∀i,j,k ∈ N0,i 6= j, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (9)
then the extra ﬂexibility given by the possibility of manipulating shares through s would be of no
value; and we could narrow down the design problem, without loss of generality, to the speciﬁcation
of monetary transfers.
It turns out that neither equivalence property extends to the shares of the non-merging ﬁrms.
That is, both the set of implementable merger rules and the surplus distribution among the agents
depend on how the shares of the non-merging ﬁrms are allocated. Intuitively, this is because the
value of each non-merging ﬁrm is not veriﬁable ex post, thus its shares are not equivalent to money.
However, we will show that a merger rule is LU-implementable, i.e. can be implemented with a
mechanism whose sharing rule has the LU property, if and only if it satisﬁes a set of monotonicity
conditions, spelled out in (14) below; and it will be straightforward to check that these monotonicity
conditions are satisﬁed by any ex-post eﬃcient merger rule.
With slight abuse of notation, we redeﬁne the agents’ types as θi := (xi,τi) where τi := xi +
vi, and θ0 := (x0,σ1,...,σn) where σi := x0 + wi, ∀i ∈ N.F o r e a c h i ∈ N, and each τi ∈
[xi + vi,xi + vi], we let [xτi,xτi] denote the interval of values of xi which are consistent with τi,
10i.e.

















,ζ ∈ [xτi,xτi]. (10)
Similarly, for each σ =( σ1,...,σn) ∈ ×i∈N [x0 + wi,x0 + wi], we let [xσ
0,xσ
0] denote the interval of
values of x0 which are consistent with σ, i.e.
[xσ
0,xσ
0]: ={x0 ∈ [x0,x0] | ∃(w1,...,w n) ∈ ×i∈N [wi,wi] such that x0 + wi = σi,i ∈ N},
and deﬁne
Uσ













The next lemma provides the standard characterization of the set of incentive compatibility con-
straints in (5) and (6) corresponding to each interval [xτi,xτi],τ i ∈ [xi + vi,xi + vi],i∈ N,
and [xσ
0,xσ
0],σ∈ ×i∈N [x0 + wi,x0 + wi]. The proof is provided in the appendix, for the sake of
completeness.
Lemma 2 If the inequalities in (6) are satisﬁed, then Bσ









0 (ζ)dζ, ∀x0 ∈ [xσ
0,xσ
0]. (12)
For each i ∈ N, if the inequalities in (5) hold, then B
τi














i (ζ)dζ, ∀xi ∈ [xτi,xτi]. (13)
11Lemma 2 has the following two immediate implications. First, the “envelope condition” in (13)
shows that the information rent of each type (xi,τi) ∈ Θ+
i of agent i increases with the fraction of
ﬁrm i t h a ti st a k e na w a yf r o ma l lt y p e s(x0
i,τi) ∈ Θi, with x0
i >x i,w h e nﬁrm i does not merge.
Similarly, (12) shows that agent 0’s ex-ante expected information rent decreases with the fraction
of his ﬁrm that he retains when no merger takes place.
Second, if we impose the LU property in (11) and (10) we obtain
Bσ
0 (·)=1− P0







i must be non-increasing, we have that the following monotonicity conditions
are necessary for any (implementable) merger rule p to be also LU-implementable:
∀σ ∈ ×i∈N [x0 + wi,x0 + wi],P 0
0 (·,σ) is non-increasing
and (14)
∀i ∈ N, τi ∈ [xi + vi,xi + vi],P i
i (·,τi) is non-decreasing.
The next proposition establishes that the conditions in (14) are also suﬃcient. Intuitively, this is
because, as (12) and (13) show, applying the LU property can only reduce the information rent of
any type of any agent, and thus can only makes it easier to satisfy both the budget balance and
the individual rationality constraints.
Proposition 1 Any implementable merger rule p which satisﬁes the monotonicity conditions in
(14) is also LU-implementable.
Consider now the eﬃcient merger rule p∗ := (p∗
0,...,p ∗






1, if vi + wi > max{0,v j + wj; j ∈ N\{i}},
0, otherwise.
(15)
It is straightforward to check that p∗ satisﬁes the monotonicity conditions in (14). Thus we have
the following corollary to Proposition 1.
5Ties, being zero probability events, are ignored.
12Corollary 1 If the eﬃcient rule p∗ is implementable, it is also LU-implementable.
The next subsection is devoted to identifying necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the
eﬃcient rule p∗ is implementable. In light of Corollary 1 we will be able to restrict attention,
without loss of generality, to LU-implementable merger rules. Thus the design of the sharing rule
s will be limited to determining the ownership structure of any new ﬁrm. As we will see, this can
be done so that the residual problem of ﬁnding a transfer function for which p∗ is implementable
becomes a special case of a classic social choice problem studied in greatest generality in Williams
[17], and Krishna and Perry [6].
3.1 The Feasibility of Eﬃcient Merger Rules
Let the variable a ∈ N0 denote any merger outcome. The social surplus generated by decision a,








    
    
0, if a =0 ,
wi, if a = i;
e vi (a,θi)=

    
    
0, if a 6= i,
vi, if a = i,
i ∈ N.
Since S (0,θ)=0and S (i,θ)=vi + wi, we have that the eﬃcient merger rule p∗ deﬁn e di n( 1 5 )
satisﬁes





Since the merger values are veriﬁable, we can now ﬁnd a sharing rule for which the surplus obtained
by ﬁrm j from decision a, net of any cash transfer, is exactly vj (a,θ). This is obtained by applying




σi+τi for all θ ∈ Θ. With this sharing
rule in place, we have
b uj (a,θ)=e vj (a,θ)+tj, j ∈ N0 (16)
13and the problem of ﬁnding a transfer rule for which p∗ is implementable becomes essentially a
special case of the general model studied in Williams [17]. To apply Williams’ main result let
a∗ (θ)=i iﬀ p∗
i (θ)=1 ,l e tZj (θj) denote the expected social surplus conditional on agent j having
type θj, i.e.












Adapting Theorem 3 in Williams [17] to our setting, we are able to establish the following result.












Proposition (2) implies that, under a mild symmetry assumption, the ex-post eﬃcient rule is im-
plementable if and only if it is common knowledge that a merger should always take place, i.e.
p∗
0 (θ)=0 , ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Corollary 2 Suppose that all variables vi, i ∈ N, have c.d.f. Φv, and support [v,v], and all
variables wi,i∈ N have c.d.f. Φw,a n ds u p p o r t[w,w]. Then p∗ is not implementable if v +w < 0.
I nt h ec a s ew i t ho n l yo n ep o t e n t i a lp a r t n e r ,i . e . n =1 , we have the following corollary to
Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 If n =1 , the eﬃcient merger rule is implementable if and only if
E [max{v + w,0}] ≤ E [max{v + w,0}]+E [max{v + w,0}] (18)
As implied by Corollary 2, if v+w<0,e ﬃciency is impossible. If instead v+w ≥ 0, then condition
(18) is satisﬁed for any distribution, since
E [v + w] ≤ E [v + w]+E [v + w] ⇐⇒ v + w ≥ 0.
14Thus in this case the eﬃcient merger rule p∗ (θ) ≡ 1 can always be implemented. The next
proposition shows that this can be done without monetary transfers.
Proposition 3 Suppose that n =1and v + w ≥ 0.T h e np∗ is implementable with a mechanism
that does not use cash.
Intuitively, since the ex post value of the merger is veriﬁable, and the merger occurs with probability
1, it is possible to satisfy the individual rationality constraints of both agents using only the shares
of the new ﬁrm. Also, the sharing rule depends only on the values of σ and τ1, which are eﬀectively
observable ex-post; thus incentive compatibility is trivially satisﬁed.
4U n v e r i ﬁable Merger Values
In this section we assume that the total value of any new merged ﬁrm is not veriﬁable, hence
redistributions of equity and monetary transfers can only be conditioned on the agents’ reports
about their types. We begin by looking at a special case which has been studied extensively in the
literature.
4.1 The Ineﬃciency of Auctions in Shares
Suppose that ﬁrm 0 has no private information, i.e. θ0 is known, and without additional loss of
generality6 set x0 = w1 = ... = wn =0 , so that the total value of the new ﬁrm created by the
merger of ﬁrms 0 and i is xi + vi. Consider the class of all mechanisms which can be described as
“auctions in shares”; that is, monetary transfers are ruled out and all shares of each non-merging
ﬁrm are retained by its owner (i.e. the LU property applies). As in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
[12], we can interpret these mechanisms as a bankruptcy auctions, in which ﬁrm 0 is worth nothing,
unless taken over by another ﬁrm.
This case was ﬁrst studied by Hansen (1985), who also assumed that xi =0for each i ∈ N.
Hansen showed that an auction in shares can implement the eﬃcient merger rule and generate a
6Since the variables x0,w 1,...,w n a r ek n o w n ,w ec a nr e d e ﬁne the synergy generated by the merger with of ﬁrm
i ∈ N as v
0
i = x0 + vi + wi.
15higher expected revenue than any auction with cash. Related papers include Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan [13] which consider bankruptcy auctions in an environment where there is information
about the joint value, and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan [14] which analyzes a second price
auction in which bidder i obtains xi + vi if it merges and xi otherwise.
We now show that Hansen’s result hinges crucially on the assumption that xi =0for each
i ∈ N. The main result in this section is that, if each agent i ∈ N has private information about
both the stand-alone value of his ﬁrm xi and the synergy term vi,t h ee ﬃcient merger rule can be
implemented with an auction in shares only if the choice of the merging partner is trivial.
To see this, consider any mechanism (p,s,0),w h e r es satisﬁes the LU property. The interim
expected surplus of type θi of agent i, when he reports θ0



















































.( 2 0 )
First note that, since monetary transfers are ruled out, any two types θi =( xi,v i) and e θi =( e xi,e vi)
such that (e xi,e vi)=( kxi,kv i) for some k>0 have identical preferences over the set of all feasible













As the next lemma establishes, this implies that, in any incentive compatible auction in shares,
“proportional” types cannot be distinguished. That is, for each i ∈ N, both Bi and Pi must be
















,ρ i ∈ [xi + vi,x i + vi].












i ∈ Θi such that θ0
i = kθi for some k>0.
16We are now ready to establish the impossibility result. Let P∗
i denote the interim probability






i (θi,y)dF−i (y),i ∈ N.
Proposition 4 If P∗
i (vi) <P∗
i (vi) for some i ∈ N, then any merger rule p which is implementable
with an auction in shares diﬀers from p∗ on a set of positive measure.
The proof of Proposition is based on the idea that, while each function Pi,i∈ N, corresponding
to any incentive compatible auction in shares must be constant along any lines of proportional
types, P∗
i depends only on vi. Therefore we can have Pi = P∗
i only if P∗
i is constant, i.e. when it
is eﬃcient for the same two ﬁrms to merge for any realization of the agent’s type. Whenever the
choice of the merging partner is non-trivial, eﬃciency cannot be attained.
4.2 Commonly Known Stand-Alone Values
In this subsection we show that, if all stand-alone values x0,x 1,...,x n are known, the eﬃcient
merger rule can always be implemented, without monetary transfers.7 In other words, there exists
a mechanism (p∗,s,0) which is incentive-feasible. This indicates that the real problem for eﬃciency
comes from private information on stand-alone values, rather than on synergies.
The mechanism (p∗,s,0) can be described as follows. If, according to the agents’ reports, no
merger generates positive synergies, then nothing happens, i.e. each owner retains full ownership
of his ﬁrm. Otherwise, the merger generating the highest synergy takes place, and agent j ∈ N0
receives fraction
xj P
k∈N0 xk of the new ﬁr m ,a sw e l la so fe a c hn o n - m e r g i n gﬁrm. Formally,
s0




, ∀k ∈ N0\{i},j∈ N0, (v,w) ∈ V × W,
where X :=
P
k∈N0 xk,V:= ×i∈N [vi,vi] and W := ×i∈N [wi,wi].
7The results generalize immediately to the case in which xi is i’s private information, but it is suﬃciently costly
for i to report b xi >x i, while reporting b xi ≤ xi can be costless. This may be the case when xi is given by tangible
assets and it is costly to engage in fraudulent overvalution of the assets.
17In the game induced by this mechanism, agent j’s utility function, when the true type proﬁle is





























It is immediate to see that for each agent truth-telling is a best response when the other agents tell
the truth. Furthermore, in the truthtelling equilibrium individual rationality is always satisﬁed.
We have thus proved the following result.
Proposition 5 If the stand-alone values x0,x 1,...,x n are commonly known, the eﬃcient merger
rule p∗ is implementable with a mechanism that does not use monetary transfers.
This result provides a justiﬁcation for the widespread use of non-cash transactions in mergers. The
mechanism is particularly simple when there is only one potential partner. In this case, if the
reported synergies are negative, the merger does not occur and each agent retains full ownership
of his ﬁrm. If instead the reported synergies are positive, the merger occurs and each agent’s share
of the new ﬁrm is proportional to the stand-alone value of his ﬁrm, i.e. agent i obtains a share
xi
x0+x1. It is thus optimal to ignore the (claimed) synergies when deciding how to divide the new
ﬁrm, using instead only the veriﬁable stand-alone values.
4.3 Known Synergies with One Partner
Suppose now that the synergies are known, while each agent has private information about the
stand-alone value of his ﬁrm. For simplicity, we focus on the case with a single potential partner,
and to make the problem interesting, we assume that the merger yields positive synergies, i.e.
  := w+v>0. Letting 1−p0 = p1 = p,a n dr1 = r,t h eex post utility of agent i =0 ,1, when the
18true types are x =( x0,x 1) and the reported ones are x0 =( x0
0,x 0













































































and the interim expected utility from reporting x0
i, when the true value is xi and the other agent


















Bi (xi) ≡ Ex−i
£
1 − p(x)s1






















Standard arguments in mechanism design, as the ones used in Lemma 2, imply that, for any
incentive compatible mechanism, Bi is non-increasing, and the function Ui (xi) ≡ b Ui (xi,x i) satisﬁes




Bi (y)dy, ∀xi ∈ [xi,xi]. (21)
Since Bi (·) ≥ 0, individual rationality is satisﬁed for each xi ∈ [xi,xi], if Ui (xi) ≥ 0.
Since the synergies are positive, we have p∗ (x)=1 , for all x ∈ ×i=1,2 [xi,xi], hence
Bi (xi)=1− Si (xi),





is the expected share of the new ﬁrm for agent i of type xi.
Incentive compatibility requires Si (xi) to be non-decreasing.






1, for xi >x −i,
0, for xi <x −i.
(Again, ties have probability zero and can be broken in any way). Acquisition mechanism are
appealing because they are simple: the merger always occurs, and the agent whose ﬁrm has the
larger stand-alone value becomes the sole owner of the new ﬁrm. Of course, in order to make the
mechanism incentive compatible, the agent agent needs to be compensated with a cash transfer.
We now show that, if the hazard rate of the distribution of each stand-alone value is monotone,
the sum of the utilities of the highest types U0 (x0)+U1 (x1) i sm a x i m i z e db ya na c q u i s i t i o n
mechanism among all mechanisms which implement the eﬃcient merger rule. This result allows us
to identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the the implementability of the eﬃcient rule in
the symmetric case.




f1(x1) if and only if x0 >x 1. Then an acquisition mechanism
maximizes the sum U0 (x0)+U1 (x1) among all mechanisms implementing the eﬃcient rule. When










f (y)F (x)dxdy +
Z x
x
F (y)(1− F (y))dy
¶
≥ 0.











−m(x−i) −  
2 , for xi >x −i,
m(xi)+ 
2 , for xi <x −i.
That is, the “winner” i, i.e. the agent who becomes the owner of the new ﬁrm, pays m(xj)+ 
2 to
the loser j. The function m has to be chosen so that incentive compatibility holds. The expected
utility of a ﬁrm of type x announcing b x under such mechanism is







[xi + y − m(y)]dF (y)+m(b xi)(1− F (b xi))
!
− xi.
For b xi = xi to be a maximizer at each xi, it must be the case that
2(xi − m(xi))f (xi)+m0 (xi)[1− F (xi)] = 0, ∀xi ∈ (x,x).
20Thus m must solve the following diﬀerential equation on the interval [x,x]
m0 (t) − 2µ(t)m(t)=−2µ(t)t,
where µ(x) ≡
f(x)




x s(1 − F (s))f (s)ds
[1 − F (t)]
2 .







m(t)dF (t).( 2 2 )









f (y)F (x)dxdy −
Z x
x
F (y)(1− F (y))dy. (23)
Since type x always becomes the owner of the new ﬁrm, by direct calculation we have
Ui (x)=E (x)+  − M (x). (24)





f (y)F (x)dxdy +
Z x
x










x s(1 − F (s))f (s)ds
[1 − F (t)]
2 dF (t),
which determines m(x).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In standard trading environments where monetary payments are bounded by liquidity constraints,
having ‘losers’ pay may facilitate the implementation of eﬃcient outcomes, by minimizing the
probability of large payments. We have shown however that, when each agent is privately informed
about the stand-alone values of his ﬁrm, it is costly, in terms of information rents, to redistribute
shares of ﬁrms which are not involved in mergers. In some cases the ﬁrst best can be obtained
without any monetary transfer, i.e. using only redistributions of shares of merging ﬁrms.
21Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Suppose that the mechanism (p,s,t) is incentive-feasible, and consider a








, i ∈ N. Deﬁne e t as
e ti
























j (θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
Thus e t is feasible.








































































Thus under the new mechanism the ex-post utility function of each agent is the same. Since the
original mechanism was incentive-feasible, incentive compatibility and individual rationality are
also satisﬁed by the new mechanism.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . For any σ ∈ ×i∈N [x0 + wi,x0 + wi], deﬁne Cσ
0 (ζ) ≡ Uσ
0 (ζ)+ζB σ
0 (ζ),
∀ζ ∈ [xσ,xσ]. The inequalities in (6) imply
Uσ




















, ∀ζ,ζ0 ∈ [xσ,xσ],





0 (ζ) ≥ Uσ












,, ∀ζ,ζ0 ∈ [xσ,xσ]. (25)
The two inequalities in (25) immediately imply that Bσ
0 is non-increasing, hence continuous almost





0 (ζ) a.e. (26)
Since Bσ
0 is bounded, (25) also implies that Uσ
0 is Lipschitz, hence absolutely continuos. Therefore
we can integrate both sides in (26) and obtain (12). The proof of the second half of the lemma is
analogous.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Suppose that (p,s,t) is incentive feasible, and without loss of generality
(by Lemma 1)s u p p o s et h a tsi





1. the sharing rule e s is determined by the LU property, deﬁn e di n( 9), and by the fact that
agent 0 becomes the sole owner of any new ﬁrm, e si
00 (θ)=1for all θ ∈ Θ,i∈ N;
2. the transfer rule e t is designed so that the change in the total value received (both in shares
and cash) by each type of each agent, for each realization of his opponents’ types, leaves the
lowest information rent which is consistent with the the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints; that is:












































i (ζ)dζ − ui ((x
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i (ζ) ≡ B
τi
i (ζ) − Pi


































0 (ζ)dζ − u0 ((xσ
0,σ),θ−i),
where Aσ






, ∀ζ ∈ [xσ
0,xσ
0].





i (θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ,j ∈ N0
because the original transfer rule t does, all shares of all ﬁrms sum up to one, i.e. si
j· ∈ ∆ ∀i,j ∈ N0,
j 6= i, and all functions Aσ
0 (·) and A
τi
i (·) take non-negative values for all σ, τi, and i ∈ N.





































































By the last inequality IR holds; and by the equality in (27) IC holds, because the original mechanism
is incentive compatible. The proof that IC and IR hold for each agent i ∈ N is analogous.
24P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . The proof simply adapts the results of Williams [17] to our setting.






where ki is a constant. In a Groves-Clarke mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. There-
fore, the only issue is whether we can ﬁnd constants ki such that each agent is willing to participate































































Finally, if the condition is satisﬁed then the Groves-Clarke mechanism where ki = Zi implements
the eﬃcient mechanism.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .Deﬁne  i = vi + wi,a n dl e tG denote the c.d.f. of  i and g its density.












25where y = v + w.I fv + w < 0, then the worst type of agent 0 is the one having θ0 =( w,...,w),
that is the lowest possible synergy for each merger, and in this case Z0 =0 .F o rﬁrm i ∈ N,t h e
w o r s tt y p ei sv. Conditional on a merger with i not taking place, the expected social surplus is the




(n − 1)yg(y)Gn−2 (y)dy








which can never be satisﬁed, since the distribution on left-hand side stochastically dominates the
one on the right. Therefore in this case eﬃciency is impossible.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Consider the following mechanism. For each announcement (θ0,θ1)
the merger occurs with probability 1. If the observed value of the merger is equal to the one implied










with α0 ≥ 0, α2 ≥ 0 and α0 + α1 =1− xσ
σ+τ − xτ
σ+τ, and no monetary transfers are made. If the
value of the merger is diﬀerent from the one implied by the announcements, then s1
00 = s1
01 =0 ,
and the ﬁrm is given to a third party.
Individual rationality is satisﬁed, since
s1
0i (θ)(σ + τ) − xi ≥ 0
for x0 ≤ xσ and x1 ≤ xτ. The sharing rule is feasible, since σ + τ ≥ xσ + xτ + v + w. Incentive
compatibility is also satisﬁed, since agents cannot lie about τ or σ and the shares are constant for
any given pair (σ,τ).
26Proof of Lemma 3. For any θi =( xi,v i) ∈ Θi and k such that kθi =( kx,kv) ∈ Θi, incentive
compatibility requires both b Ui (θi,θ i) ≥ b Ui (kθi,θ i) and b Ui (kθi,k θ i) ≥ b Ui (θi,k θ i). Also, since
b Ui (·,k θ i)=k b Ui (·,θ i), the second inequality is equivalent to b Ui (kθi,θ i) ≥ b Ui (θi,θi). Combining
this with the ﬁrst inequality yields b Ui (θi,θ i)=b Ui (kθi,θ i). Thus, omitting the subscript i to save
notation, we have
(x + v) B (kx,kv) − xL(kx,kv)=( x + v) B (x,v) − xL(x,v). (28)
I nl i g h to f( 2 8 ) ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that B (kx,kv)=B (x,v), that is that B is constant along
any line of proportional types. To this end, deﬁne U (x,v)=( x + v) B (x,v) − xL(x,v).B y
standard mechanism design arguments, U must be continuous and convex, hence diﬀerentiable
a l m o s te v e r y w h e r e .A te v e r yp o i n ta tw h i c hi ti sd i ﬀerentiable we have
∂U
∂x
= B (x,v) − L(x,v), (29)
∂U
∂v
= B (x,v). (30)
Suppose ﬁrst that b U is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Denoting derivatives with subscripts in
the usual way, we have
∂ b U (x0,v0;x,v)
∂v 0
¯
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
((x0,v0)=(x,v))




Bv = Lv. (31)
Diﬀerentiating (29) w.r.t. v, and (30) w.r.t. x, by the equality of the second mixed partial deriva-
tives of U,w eh a v e
Bv − Lv = Bx. (32)
Now the directional derivative of B, at any point (x,v), along the line of types which are propor-























27the second equality following from (32), and the last one from (31). This proves the Lemma when
U is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
We are left with the task of proving the Lemma in the case in which U is not twice continuously
diﬀerentiable. Since U i si nt h ef e a s i b l es e t ,i ti sc o n v e x ,a n ds a t i s ﬁes
∂U(x,v)
∂v = B (x,v), for any
(x,v) in a set K ⊂ Θ of full measure. We now invoke Theorem H.4.5 in Mas Colell [7], which






¯ ¯ ¯ < 1
m ∀(x,v) ∈ K.
Since Um is smooth, we know that
∂Um(x,v)
∂v = Bm (x,v) is constant along any line of proportional
types, i.e. Bm (x,αx)=bm (α) each (x,α) such that (x,αx) ∈ Θ. Thus, for each m we have
|B (x,αx) − bm (α)| < 1
m, ∀(x,α) such that (x,αx) ∈ K. Since, for each α, the sequence (bm (α)) is
contained in the compact interval [0,1], there exists a strictly increasing sequence (mk) of positive
integers such that (bmk (α)) converges to some b(α) ∈ [0,1]. Combining this with the previous
inequality, and letting k →∞ , we obtain
B (x,αx)=b(α), ∀(x,α) such that (x,αx) ∈ K.
This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .By Lemma 3, Pi must be constant along any line of proportional types.
Therefore, we can ﬁnd xi,x 0
i ∈ [xi,xi] and v0
i,v i ∈ [vi,vi] such that P∗
i (v0
i) >P∗














P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . By standard mechanism design arguments, we have U0
i (xi)=−Bi (xi)=


































Ui (x)dFi (x)=Ui (xi)+
Z xi
xi
Bi (x)F (x)dx. (33)








(x + y + v)si (x,y)dF−i (y)dFi (x) −
Z xi
xi
Mi (x)dFi (x), (34)





















































xi Fi (x)dx. Since budget balance implies
R b1
a1 M1 (x)dF1 (x)+
R b2
a2 M2 (x)dF2 (x)=0 ,
and s1
00 (x0,x 1)=1− s1





























f1(x1), an acquisition mechanism maximizes U0 (x0)+Ui (x0).










hence the condition Ui (x) ≥ 0 can be written as





f (y)F (x)dxdy +
Z x
x
F (y)(1− F (y))dy.
Finally, we observe that individual rationality is satisﬁed because Ui (xi) ≥ 0 implies Ui (xi) ≥ 0
for each xi ∈ [xi,xi].
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